Hon. Andrew Leslie (As an Individual):
COMMITTEES
Hon. Andrew Leslie (As an Individual):
VIDEO https://www.ourcommons.ca/embed/en/i/12982021/?ml=en&vt=watch
LINK Hon. Andrew Leslie (As an Individual):
https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/NDDN/meeting-125/evidence
Hon. Andrew Leslie
My
intent is to offer some criticism of the status quo, so that we can
learn and then perhaps, in question period, get into some solutions.
Essentially,
in my opinion, “Strong, Secure, Engaged”, which was the precursor to
the current defence policy, delivered nothing substantive in terms of
modern military equipment. It saw Canada, in fact, become weaker, more
insecure and essentially absent from the deployable stables of troops
required for either United Nations missions or, of course, NATO.
The
2024 defence policy update of “Our North, Strong and Free” is no
better, unfortunately, in that it promises some urgently needed
equipment years from now, but nothing today. Indeed, the 2024 defence
spend will be less than that of 2023.
Of
course, we're well aware of what just happened down in the United
States. Both Republicans and Democrats are united and increasingly vocal
about telling Canada how disappointed, frustrated and fed up they are
with Canada's failure to defend itself and its allies, with a special
mention of the Arctic.
Meanwhile,
as we know—and I was involved in the last NAFTA renegotiations—that's
coming due at a time when a variety of key players down south have
articulated clearly that a base of 3% perhaps looms on the horizon and
that defence, security, trade and border security are all intertwined.
At
this time of crisis internationally, with what's happening in the
Middle East and in Ukraine, Canada's military readiness is at its lowest
level in 50 years. Canada spent, last year, in 2023, more money on
consultants and professional services than it did on the army, navy and
air force combined, which, quite frankly, is madness.
The
army has over 50% of its vehicle fleets awaiting spare parts and
technicians. The navy is struggling mightily to keep a handful of
elderly warships at sea, specifically in the Indo-Pacific, and they're
desperately short of trained sailors. The air force has been unable to
participate in significant NATO deterrent exercises, either up north or
out over the oceans, in conjunction with our friends and allies because
they don't have the pilots, the spare parts or the money to fly the
aircraft.
In
the Arctic, which is many times larger than Europe, Canada has fewer
than 300 military support staff, who are not a deterrent. They're
essentially unarmed. Some of them are part-time, bless them. There are
about 1,600 Canadian Rangers equipped with Ski-Doos and rifles, who are
not combatants. Their role is to observe and report.
The
bottom line is that Canada has no permanently assigned combat elements
to deter potential presence by the Russians or the Chinese, who are
showing up in our waters with increasing frequency, but other people do.
Russia, specifically, has between 25,000 to 35,000 combat troops
deployed in its Arctic, with huge amounts of operational equipment—air,
land and sea.
The United States, bless them, has 22,000 full-time and part-time
military professionals with more equipment than the entirety of the
Canadian Forces in terms of combat delivery. Thank you, America, for
defending our Arctic.
We
are facing unprecedented dangers and challenges and, quite frankly, I
see no sense of urgency to change, modify or re-guide the efforts of the
government toward supporting and assisting the Canadian Forces.
Here are some facts.
We
have fewer than 35 military personnel deployed on UN missions. In 2003,
we had close to 2,500. We are the only NATO nation whose level of
military operational readiness is going down when everyone else's is
skyrocketing up.
We
have the longest and the least efficient procurement system in
NATO—indeed, in any nation that I can find. We are the only nation in
NATO that does not have a costed plan to get to 2% of GDP, which was
first agreed to by the Minister of Defence in 2008 and reiterated in
2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.... I could go on.
We are the only NATO nation whose defence minister
has publicly admitted that he could not convince his fellow cabinet
members of the importance of NATO defence spending and the 2% of GDP. As
mentioned already, we're the only NATO nation whose defence budget
decreased this year.
(0930)
Mr. Chair, I look forward to your questions.
General
Leslie, under the most severe circumstances, if Canada does not fill
the blind spot with our satellites, install air defence in the far north
or patrol the Arctic waterways, and if the U.S. feels threatened and
exposed, what will the Americans do to protect our continent's northern
flank?
There's an old saying, which is sometimes true, that sovereignty has to
be seen to be effective. In our case, with our sovereign troops
deployed in the Arctic, through no fault of their own, due to lack of
equipment, lack of numbers, lack of training and lack of resources,
which boils down to taxpayer money, it has resulted in, from a Canadian
perspective, our Arctic being undefended.
The
more the Americans get used to the idea that they have to secure and
defend it for us, the more it's logical to assume that they may well
look to some sort of economic compensation from the resources in the
Arctic, which Canadians.... It's hard to find any Canadian who doesn't
admire the beauty and the pristine nature of our Arctic, but we have to
spend time, money and effort to make sure it remains ours, with our
friends and allies.
Former NATO Parliamentary Assembly president and senior member of the
armed services committee, now chair of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Congressman Mike Turner recently wrote an
op-ed in Newsweek entitled “Trudeau—Not Trump—Is the Greatest Threat to
NATO”.
Why does the DPU evoke such a sense of non-confidence from our greatest ally?
Canada spends a considerable amount on the bigger-picture defence
issues. As you're well aware, in 2017, NATO changed the rules wherein a
whole host of issues ancillary to the business of fighting and winning
the nation's wars were counted as defence spending: veterans' pensions,
some of the support agencies, and the list goes on.
What
we have to do is question the output of the Canadian investment in
defence. Output is a variety of many factors. It includes well-trained,
fit, capable men and women who are willing to go overseas and do
dangerous things on our behalf. They have to have the right equipment,
the right facilities, the right training, infrastructure and the money
to buy ammo.
By the way, how's that ammo contract going? I'm sorry. I'm asking you a question. That's unfair.
We
are not getting the bang for our buck. Why is that? If you have a
nation that spends more on professional services and consultants than it
does on the army, navy and air force combined, if you have a nation
that has increased its public servants by over 40% since 2015 at a now
staggering cost, and if you have essentially a defence procurement
system that is arguably among the very worst in the world for the
purchase of big stuff like combat equipment, aircraft, ships and
submarines.... By the way, the evidence is irrefutable. There is no
evidence of the current government actually buying a large, complex
modern weapons system in the last decade.
On
what programs and initiatives is the Liberal government trying to
nickel-and-dime our CAF that are limiting its operational capability and
effectiveness? I believe you referred to that in the National Post.
Essentially,
the armed forces are short anywhere between 13,000 and 16,000 people.
To address that shortfall, it would be at least an additional billion
dollars per year just for the personnel costs.
On
top of that, you have the basic and advanced training requirements. Due
to the lack of progress on any of the major weapons systems needed to
allow our people to survive contemporary warfare—especially since the
warfare examples we have in Ukraine are showing that new technologies
are required, plus a whole bunch of the older ones—our armed forces are
woefully ill-equipped. That bow wave of equipment acquisition is what's
causing the government to step back from announcing, for example, a
contract for the ammunition systems for the ships, for the planes, for
the tanks, and it goes on.
You
also said that about 72% of the army's vehicles and trailers are
off-line. Do most of these vehicles need maintenance, or do they need to
be replaced entirely?
It's both. A whole bunch of this stuff is old. That which is not
necessarily old doesn't have the spare parts to make sure that it can
run adequately, especially when you use it for advanced training, where
vehicles tend to get beaten up a bit.
What
is needed in this particular instance is a threefold increase. One is
for additional mechanics and for people who can service those vehicles.
The second is for the ammunition to actually allow the systems to train,
and for the gas and the spare parts. The third is the people to
actually man the equipment, because with more people, you reduce the
individual stresses and workloads, which have contributed to a higher
attrition rate.
(0935)
Are the troops we have in Latvia properly equipped, with proper vehicles should that become a hot zone?
No,
they're not properly equipped. They are doing the best with what they
have. They have Leopard 2 tanks. They now have a nascent air defence
system for short range, but none for medium or long. They don't have an
exhaustive drone suite. They don't have the articulated and dispersed
command and control architectures that a modern soldier needs to survive
in the battlefield. I could go on.
The
armed forces are doing the best with what they have, but there's a lack
of defence acquisition or willingness of this government to spend money
on the troops.
Of the 72 vehicles that are off-line, can you break down which vehicle types are the most prevalent to be inoperable?
Currently, the vehicle types that are mostly broken are the ones you
need the most when you go to war or when you want to deter Russians from
advancing into Latvia. That's tanks, armoured personnel carriers, light
armoured vehicles, artillery systems, mortar and target acquisition
radars. Also, the command and control architecture is 25 years old.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Welcome to our witnesses.
General
Leslie, I had the opportunity during the summer to visit the
recruitment centre here in Ottawa. The staff there in the offices are
doing a terrific job. The recruiters seem to be doing an amazing job as
it relates to encouraging people to apply. It's been reported several
times that we had nearly 70,000 applications in a calendar year, but
only 5,000 people were making it through the process.
Can
I get your thoughts in terms of how we break it down? I don't want to
call it bureaucratic barriers, but how do we fix that problem, knowing
that it's not for a lack of people showing interest?
There
seem to be some internal issues related to processing those
applications. The DPU speaks to that and highlights changes and
recommendations that it is hoped will solve that in whole or in part.
Can I get your thoughts on that issue, in particular?
Essentially,
the recruiting issue.... It's a crisis, as has been well articulated by
the chief of the defence staff. Your numbers are quite right: 70,000
showed up, and only 5,000 got through.
Let's not forget the issue of the increase in bureaucracy. Very often,
when organizations are under stress, they try to centralize management.
When they're under stress and try to get complicated things done to have
an output, therein lie problems, because that massive degree of
centralization stifles initiative and stifles the ability to move
quickly. What we have here is a failure in process and a failure in
management.
I
would like to remind all of us that, according to the National Defence
Act, the Minister of National Defence “holds office during pleasure” and
has as a responsibility “the management and direction of the Canadian
Forces”. This is a ministerial issue, and he should be personally
accountable to Canada and to Canadians for its resolution in the
immediate sense because of the looming threat and because our friend and
ally down south is getting really tired of covering for us.
I
had the opportunity to look at a couple of historical audits, and this
issue goes back a number of years. Can I ask what steps were taken 10,
15, 20 years ago to resolve this issue? It's not a new issue, so do you
have any experience in that regard in terms of some of the issues that
you just raised?
I
do, and I'd be willing to offer it. I may sound a bit old-fashioned
when I do so, but when I first joined the Canadian Armed Forces, a long
time ago, it took me about four to five days to do the paperwork. There
were no hand-held social media devices then.
At
the height of the Afghan war, we had, at peak, close to 5,000 troops
deployed, with less money and a smaller force. We were buying new
equipment left, right and centre. We decentralized recruiting
essentially down to the reserve units so that they could do it
themselves, because they live in the local environs much more so than
the regular force. For the regular force, we got the battalions and
regiments actively involved, and we were ruthless about accepting risk.
Do
you have to be perfectly healthy to join the Canadian Armed Forces? The
answer is no, but there are certain things that are showstoppers. What
are they? Perhaps you can do a bit of training concurrently, accept the
risk that you may have duplication, make sure no one's injured prior to
graduation, and carry on. Background security checks are taking way too
long. How much risk is there actually in terms of a private knowing x, y
or z about a weapons system that is readily available in a variety of
international bazaars?
(0940)
I'll switch very quickly to Russia. Ukrainian Canadians, in particular
those in my riding, are very nervous about what comes next with the
U.S.'s support, or lack thereof, for the war in Ukraine.
I'm
looking for your advice as it relates to how we deal with a person like
Donald Trump, knowing that his goals and objectives related to the
situation and the war in Ukraine are different from our own. I want to
get your thoughts on how likely it is for Canada and its allies to
succeed in assisting Ukraine in its efforts against Russia without
support, in whole or in part, from the United States.
It's not my place to comment on the president-elect of the United
States. That's his business, but I can give you lots of commentary about
what Canada might and should consider in terms of the looming issues
surrounding Russia's war in Ukraine.
Let's
take a look at just Canada. We have 41 million people and a
$2.4-trillion economy, and we've managed to scrape together four guns,
eight tanks, a couple thousand rifles and a couple thousand rounds of
ammunition. That is nothing to be proud of. It is abhorrent.
Where
is that ammunition contract for the production of the 155-millimetre
war shots that Ukraine has been desperately asking for, which some
ill-advised people—I was going to use a much harsher word—cancelled a
few short years ago? Why hasn't that been signed?
[Translation]
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Welcome to the witnesses.
Dr. Lagassé, in 2023, you wrote an article entitled “Defence Policy and Procurement Costs: The Case for Pessimism Bias”.
That
was a few months before the defence policy was released. You said that
the department was rather optimistic when it prepared a budget, but that
it perhaps had to, if you'll pardon the expression, set its sights on
being more pessimistic.
When
you saw the new policy, did you feel that the department had taken into
account the article you had written a few months earlier?
I don't think so, and I'll give you an example.
We
just learned from one of the officers of Parliament that even the
projections for reaching the 2% of GDP goal for defence spending by 2032
are based on analyses that the Canadian economy will be in recession.
That's another way of interpreting it. We're going to meet the target
because we take certain things for granted economically and we don't
take different scenarios into account. Unfortunately, I have to answer
no to your question. We'll see what happens with the budget, for
example, with respect to submarines, but I also think they will be quite
optimistic.
This
is part of a culture in which they always want to move forward and
don't want to give direct and honest answers, especially at the
Department of Finance. Finance always wants people to spend less, and
the Department of National Defence always wants the government's
approval and permission to initiate projects. This creates a scenario in
which National Defence indicates that a project costs much less in
order to get approval from the Department of Finance for a budget line.
That creates scenarios, as the general was saying, where you end up with
several projects when you simply don't have the budget to initiate
them. In other words, there's a lack of funds. Even if the project is
well designed and ready to go, they decide not to move forward, because
they simply don't have the funds required to meet the needs.
There's
been a lot of talk about air defence for the land force. This project
suffered an extraordinary delay because it was poorly funded. I don't
want to give too much information about my role as an acquisitions
adviser, but I can say that, when I reviewed this project within the
department, it was extremely frustrating, because it was needed, but
there was a lack of funding to move forward. That's one example.
Then
there are trucks, which are a basic component. You've seen that a truck
project is now being split in two, simply to make sure they move
forward with the budget they have. They're setting aside the other part,
which involves armoured vehicles, because they're still waiting for
other funding before they move forward. Unfortunately, this is very
common.
(0945)
As
a result, either the projects are not completed or they cost a lot more
than anticipated. Doesn't that feed a certain cynicism toward the
Department of National Defence, not only among some observers, but also
among our allies and Canadians in general?
Yes, and that's especially true when it comes to ships.
Honestly,
I don't know who came up with the idea that 15 modern warships were
going to cost $26 billion. Now we're being told that they're going to
cost $100 billion, and once again we're wondering where these
projections come from. The government is currently insisting that the
budget for the 15 ships is still $60 billion, even though we know that
all other analyses say that they will cost $100 billion.
When
will the government be honest with Canadians? When will they be honest
with you, the parliamentarians, about costs? There's no point in always
being optimistic and hoping that people won't notice that the cost has
simply doubled or even tripled. That's not the way to do it.
Thank you very much.
General Leslie, you seem very critical of the latest federal defence policy, and rightly so, I'm sure.
What do you think of the Canadian government's current defence procurement policy?
I
think our procurement system is indeed the worst in the world, frankly.
We can see the results. In the past 10 years, the Canadian Forces have
not received a single advanced, modern and complex system that's been
put into service. In addition, there's a cost associated with every year
of delay.
[English]
The cost of delay is the price of failure. As a result of 10 years of
procrastination and dithering on defence acquisition, with, quite
frankly, an enormous bureaucracy that has grown even bigger, which
doesn't necessarily make for efficiency, the cost of buying complicated
defence equipment is probably three times what it was in 2015. It's kind
of like the housing issue. The more you let the problem fester, the
more expensive the equipment gets, which then blows to smithereens your
cost estimates.
Thank you, both, for appearing today.
I'm always interested in talking more about that illustrious or
arbitrary 2%—however you may want to deem it. There's been a lot of
pressure on Canada to reach it, for obvious reasons, and we could do so,
I think, with the spending that may come forward, certainly, in terms
of the F-35s, submarines and what have you.
We've
talked a great deal in this committee about the fact that we have such
an incredible recruitment and retention crisis. We have a military
housing crisis. There's a lot lacking in terms of what the rank and file
need on the ground to have the kind of life to be able to do the job
we're asking of them. There's a great reliance on outsourcing and
consulting. I think this is part of what you were getting at, General.
There have been cuts, and then there's been a backfill, and yet that
backfill isn't actually meeting what's necessary. I certainly think it's
because of this outside consulting; that's my opinion.
Do
you agree that reaching the 2% through those major procurement projects
isn't enough? What do we have to do to focus and ensure that we're
doing what people on the ground actually need?
I deeply and sincerely appreciate the work of this committee in trying
to bring to light some issues that are of ever-increasing importance to
the average, everyday Canadian. Unfortunately, it's a tough job, because
most Canadians, deep down, know nothing about defence. Quite frankly, I
don't think the government has done a lot to lead the people of Canada
into exposing to them the consequences of failing to meet obligations
that we promised.
Let's
not forget that. We promised in 2008, at the Minister of Defence level,
and we promised in 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021 and
2022 that we'd meet it. Oops, in 2023, we said we're not going to meet
it until 2032, which is an arbitrary number chosen by the Prime Minister to get him out of a really tight jam in his visit down to Washington.
There's
nothing in the fiscal framework that indicates the Government of Canada
is serious about meeting that 2%. It doesn't count unless it's in the
fiscal framework. Where's that ammunition contract? Talk about an easy
sell. That's representative. That's typical. People have lost sight of
the actual output required by the Canadian Forces. That's what we should
be measured on. Quite frankly, that's what our allies are measuring us
on.
When
we whine that we can't meet 2% by 2024, the rest of NATO doesn't care,
because we promised that we could and we would, and here we are. I think
it's going to get surprisingly tough for us over the next couple of
months as we get asked a lot of really hard questions in the context of
North American defence, NATO contributions and North American free
trade—all of which are linked, but a lot of Canadians don't see it that
way.
(0950)
It's not entirely what I asked, though, sir.
Do you just do it through large procurement contracts? How do you
balance it with what the needs of the forces are on the ground?
It's an excellent question. I apologize. My political skills rose to
the fore. I answered the question I hoped you were going to ask and not
the one you actually asked. I've been caught flat out. Well done.
The
armed forces have a plan. The government has a plan. You just have to
fund it now, and you have to take the timelines and compress them.
Whereas in the past you could live with a decade, now you're talking
about a matter of months.
“That's
impossible,” you'll say. We did it during the Afghan war. We bought
tanks in less than six months and C-17s in four. We bought the 777s in
the space of five or six months. We had troops training on those new
tanks while they were rumbling forward into the battle area. I could go
on, because there's a long list that demonstrates—
What if you don't have pilots to fly the F-35s or you don't have enough navy personnel to man a sub?
The
two are matched. You have to do one commensurate with the other,
keeping in mind that it takes about a decade to produce a pilot. It
takes about a decade to buy an F-35. There should be a match when they
first enter service, but there's not, because the attrition rate was so
high, in part because no one was willing to dedicate the energy and the
time. No one outside of the uniformed component was willing to dedicate
the energy and the time to fixing it.
Now, perhaps, it's going to get more attention, keeping in mind that the minister is responsible for this.
As a New Democrat.... One of the foundations, which we didn't see at
all in the defence update, is about peacekeeping. It makes zero mention
of peacekeeping initiatives, yet Canadians were foundational in the
creation of that.
The
government promised the international community, and maybe this falls
into what you were talking about in terms of those promises and
obligations that have not been fulfilled.... Do you think Canada needs
to do more to honour that commitment? Should it have been included in
the DPU?
Absolutely. I think I mentioned in my prepared remarks that Canada
currently has 35, or slightly fewer, military peacekeepers deployed.
I'd
like to point out that Ukraine, which is fighting a savage war in
Russia and literally having to trade its soldiers' lives for ground held
because it doesn't have the ammunition needed—which Canada could have
been providing if we hadn't cancelled that contract—has more
peacekeepers deployed than we do.
Colleagues, we have 25 minutes' worth of questions, and we only have about 20 minutes, so we'll chop off a minute.
You have four minutes, Mr. Stewart.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to the witnesses.
General Leslie, how are we doing? We know how we're doing at the macro
level on recruiting and retention. How are we doing with our pay and
benefits for soldiers? Should we be taking a hard look at that as part
of our increase in spend?
(0955)
Yes, we should be. They just got a recent pay raise, which was modest,
but when you consider the stress they've had to go through—especially
those stalwarts who have stuck it out over the last five or six years,
the middle managers, the supervisors, the sergeants major, the warrant
officers and the captains, and the list goes on—a pay raise, but a
significant one, would certainly do wonders, especially for the cost of
living increases that have happened elsewhere.
Yes, it's long overdue.
It
is, particularly in the communities we're trying to recruit from.
Toronto is a very expensive place to live. On the reserve side, getting
those soldiers out has become increasingly difficult, given the lack of
incentive from a salary standpoint.
I
wanted to ask you about the conflict in the Middle East, the war in
Ukraine and the general hostilities globally. How concerning is it for
you, the lack of readiness in our armed forces to participate in and
contribute to these global conflicts?
Canada,
as was articulated earlier, is roughly within the top 10 or 12 defence
spenders, according to the way we count it. However, I think it's been
quite clear, through my testimony and that of others, that our output is
not commensurate with the amount of money we spend. The first issue is
to try to figure out what we have to do, what we're willing to spend to
get it done and how quickly we can get it done.
Suddenly,
we're faced with three demanding scenarios. There's one in the
Indo-Pacific with China and its expansionist tendencies. The second one
is the unfolding, continuing tragedies in the Middle East, egged on by
Iran and Russia. Finally, of course, there is the looming spectre of the
potential of further vast amounts of bloodshed in Ukraine, depending on
what happens over the next couple of months with senior decision-makers
elsewhere.
Is Canada prepared to fill some of the holes that could result from a
more centralist view of the United States, and how much is it willing to
contribute to the defence of others? We'd better be able to step up to
the plate.
How do you feel about the risk in the Arctic? You mentioned earlier
that sovereignty is about being seen. Maybe there's an economic price
that we're going to have to pay should we want this defended by one of
our allies. To the extent that we're not in the Arctic, can we really
claim sovereignty there, if we're outsourcing that to the United States?
That's
an excellent point, sir. Russia and China have both been engaged, since
2007, in a court case before the United Nations, in which they do not
recognize a significant portion of Canada's claims to the Arctic seabed.
If they don't recognize it, then they could challenge us, just by
having their exploration vessels show up in our waters. We have no
permanently deployed naval forces to challenge them. That, in itself, is
a huge risk.
By
the way, Russia and China have recently formed an entente on Arctic
exploitation, and China has articulated its vision for including an
Arctic passage in its belt and road initiative.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thanks to both of our witnesses. Thank you for being here to answer some of our questions.
There's a huge amount of spending and dollars that would come if we
were to meet our 2% target much sooner. I agree that we need to work on
that, and we need to get to a level of readiness, considering the
situation in the world and the results of the elections the other day.
Of
course, in order to be able to do this, the population does, to some
extent, need to support this spending. I'm wondering what messages you
think our government should start sharing to the general public. I don't
think everybody follows these meetings, and this is pretty much the
only public space where these conversations are had and people can
actually get this information.
What messages should we be sharing to the population to get them on board with this kind of change and shift?
You can both respond.
The first one I would point to is the fact that there's actually been
quite a bit of movement, and it's not well understood. This is where, I
think, I disagree a little bit with the general.
New
capabilities have yet to come online, but in the past few years we have
bought new air-to-air refuelling aircraft. We have bought maritime
patrol aircraft. We are buying 88 F-35s. We have drones for the Arctic.
We have MRZRs for the special forces. We are buying polar icebreakers.
We are buying program icebreakers. We are buying a polar epsilon
satellite system. The list goes on and on.
It's
striking to me that there remains a view—a lagging indicator, as it
were, which we all remember from COVID—that the Canadian Armed Forces
are simply unequipped, will never be equipped and everything is falling
apart. That's true today, because we are dealing with a decade-long, or
generational, gap in the capabilities we require. In the next 10 to 15
years, vast numbers of new capabilities will be coming on board.
There
has to be at least some effort to put a positive spin on the story.
Otherwise, if it is so negative, you simply put your hands up and you
give up. We have to, at one point, acknowledge that there is an effort
to re-equip the forces. If we want Canadians to join the armed forces
and contribute, you have to tell them we are acquiring new equipment.
Otherwise, why would you join a force that is never going to be
equipped? Why would you join a force when the message, continuously, is
that it's falling apart?
I
agree that we need to point to the problems. We also have to at least
acknowledge that we are making progress. This does span two governments.
Various people can take credit for this. If we solely focus on the
negative and are never trying to actually demonstrate that we are making
progress.... It's not enough, but we are making progress. That is a
necessary part of the story that we have to tell if we want Canadians to
be part of this institution.
I'm usually a pessimistic guy, so this is surprising coming out of me.
(1000)
Thank you. You're absolutely right. I think we have made great strides, and I think we're on the right path.
However,
given the testimony we've heard from many witnesses, there is still a
lot to be done and there are lots of improvements that could be made. I
think that our government might be willing to go there in the next
budget and, perhaps, in subsequent budgets. I'm wondering what messages
we should share to the public to get them on board with this major
increase in defence spending. That's where I was going with that
question.
I
would say that leadership is required from the federal government.
Prime ministers and cabinet can't always be expected to figure out which
way the parade is going and get behind it. They actually have to get in
front of this issue.
It's
quite true that, in years to come, the Canadian Forces will get better
in terms of equipment, but in my opinion NATO doesn't care. We said we'd
get to 2% by 2024. We are a long way from that right now. I don't think
senior leadership in the United States, both existing and about to be,
really cares at all what our excuses might be. They're fairly
transactional, and I think they're looking for quick results. That has
an impact on trade, and our trade negotiations are coming due now. If
you put it in that context, there's a pretty clear message.
We're going to have to leave it there.
[Translation]
You have a minute and a half, Mr. Brunelle‑Duceppe.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Dr. Lagassé,
you heard General Leslie's comments in my last intervention. The
procurement system at Canada's Department of National Defence is the
worst in the world. That's more or less what we've been told.
First,
do you share the general's opinion? Second, if you were to make one key
recommendation, what would it be? We're no longer just talking about a
change in direction; the entire model needs to change, if we're truly in
that situation.
The
problem isn't unique to the Department of National Defence. This is a
generalized problem in the Canadian government. The government doesn't
like risk, and it avoids it at all costs. Why? When mistakes are made,
as was the case with ArriveCAN, the entire system blows up. Then they
say that we need more regulations, more procedures and more officials to
oversee everything.
There's
a culture in the Canadian government that leads people to avoid risk at
all costs. As the general said, if you want to buy equipment quickly
and have capabilities quickly, you have to accept a certain level of
risk.
There's
a notion that when you fail very quickly, you can fix things right
away. That culture doesn't exist in the Canadian government, since they
want to avoid risk at all costs, even if they're able to rectify the
situation.
According
to one of your recommendations, the government should therefore accept a
certain level of risk when it comes to procurement.
(1005)
[English]
Dr.
Lagassé, when you came before the committee last, we were talking about
procurement. We talked about sole-sourced contracts and the problems
that may exist. During the study, there were many who were concerned
about transparency and accountability, so much in that sort of [Inaudible—Editor] about taking risks.
The
United States has an accountability office specifically on that. Is
that something that Canada needs to do? How does the government reach
that accountability level in terms of those big-ticket items?
In
Canada, the accountability problem is not one of more oversight, more
bodies that are checking the government. It's one of fundamental
transparency. If you want greater accountability in this country, you
need greater transparency. As I said the last time I was here, this
committee should have clearances to be able to examine all sorts of
acquisition requirements—things that are moving forward—in order to be
able to do its work.
This
is fundamentally the issue. If you want to have greater accountability
from government, you have to have greater transparency from government.
We not only have the slowest procurement system; we are also one of the
least transparent countries out there, particularly among the Five Eyes.
The amount of information withheld from you that prevents you from
doing your job, from holding the government to account, is astounding.
If we want greater accountability, step one is not more oversight; step one is greater transparency.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, General and Professor, for joining us here today.
General Leslie, you were a Liberal member of Parliament. Did Prime Minister Trudeau or Minister Sajjan ever come to you for advice on developing things like defence policy?
I'll answer the question and put it in context. Prior to the 2015
election, I was the co-chair, along with Marc Garneau, of the Liberal
policy platform sessions that focused on defence, security and borders.
In that context, I was very pleased to have quite a say and influence on
the Liberal defence platform of 2015 and also on veterans policy.
There was some, but a lot of it was based on the work that had gone into defence policy platforms. The tragedy is—
When
it comes down to delivery of what was in there, did they talk to you
about how to get things done, how to buy the kit that we need?
No, I tried several times, although not necessarily with the Prime Minister, because his interest in defence, as we all know, is not terribly high.
When we talk about the Prime Minister....
You mentioned the National Defence Act and how the minister is
responsible for the leadership and operational direction of the Canadian
Armed Forces and serves, at will, the Prime Minister. Was that lack of
accountability, that lack of oversight and responsibility, due to the
lack of interest by Prime Minister Trudeau?
I
think it's fairly clear that the willingness of cabinet, until quite
recently, to pay attention to the details of defence and to do what the
professor suggests—which is to try to reduce the levels of bureaucracy
while increasing accountability—essentially has gone nowhere for the
last 10 years because of their level of interest in defence and security
issues. This is why we're in such.... We're not in big trouble, but
it's why we're in such disrepute with our friends and allies in NATO and
have increasing disrepute down south. We promised to do something that
would involve a commitment of finances, and we have not followed through
on that promise, so we're being held to account now.
Professor Lagassé clearly laid out what the government has purchased,
which we, as the official opposition, have supported.
With
the procurements that have taken place, has there been enough kinetic
equipment purchased to ensure we can defend Canada and participate in
allied missions as required?
Absolutely, categorically no.
The
focus has not been on kinetic equipment—things that harm people. Keep
in mind that the ultimate role of the Canadian Forces, and the one they
prepare for, is engaging in combat and fighting and winning the nation's
wars alongside our friends and allies.
What
do we need to buy to ensure we're providing the equipment to protect
Canada, as in air defence? What do we need to further complement our
efforts in places like Latvia and elsewhere in NATO missions?
There is a list longer than my leg—my arm is a bit gibbled right now—that I could easily rattle off.
Simply
put, the short-term things that are readily achievable within a matter
of months, if we have the will, include long-range precision strike
rocket systems for the army, new self-propelled guns, a real air defence
system that can reach out and touch past the short-range system we've
currently acquired—you need short-range, medium-range and
farther-range—more drone capability, command and control architectures,
and new naval vessels. A ship contract would be nice. Ammunition for the
army would be very nice. Have I mentioned ammunition?
(1010)
I think I'm running out of time here.
Professor
Lagassé, I'm not asking you to respond but rather to provide to the
committee in writing how we bring about accountability while speeding up
procurement. Transparency comes into that. We need some direction on
how to fix a system that's clearly broken and not working.
If you can answer that, we'll monetize it.
Voices: Oh, oh!
The Chair: You have four minutes, Ms. Lapointe.
Thank you both for being here.
Dr.
Lagassé, one of the things we haven't talked about yet today is
cyber-threat security. We've had other witnesses before this committee
talking about how this is a growing threat.
Can you tell us how governments can collaborate to develop stronger cybersecurity measures for countries?
I think the first thing Canada needs to realize is that this is not
something that will be solved within government. It has to be a
partnership with the private sector. I can't emphasize this enough. If
we rely on government procedures and IT policies to ensure cybersecurity
in this country, we will fall short.
If
you look at our largest allies, they rely on and are working closely
with all the big IT firms. In the United States, it's Google, Microsoft,
AWS and Oracle. In the United Kingdom and Australia, it's AWS. That's
simply because of the level of expertise and know-how. Keeping pace with
that threat is not something the public sector can do adequately, given
the systems we have.
In
a Canadian context, this extends beyond simply working with these large
firms in the national security community. It also means working with
the banking sector and other vulnerable sectors, because it isn't so
much an attack on national defence and the national security community
that will make us vulnerable; it is an attack on the civilian, private
sector banking sector that will leave us hobbled. That level of
co-operation is not adequate yet.
We're certainly seeing times of uncertainty at home and abroad.
Dr.
Lagassé, how does Canada best position itself as a strong country,
partner and ally, and what investments do you think we need to make?
I
suggest that one of the chief problems we have is trying to be all
things to all people—and we try to do that on a very small budget.
As I've said in many other fora, we like to think of ourselves as the
Australia of North America, when in reality we are the New Zealand of
North America. That's simply to say that it's better to recognize that
if we are only willing to spend 1.5% of GDP on defence—which has
historically been the case—perhaps we should focus on specific areas and
contributions we can make and do them the best we can. It may be the
Arctic, which the United States has increasingly been asking us to do.
It may be other specific types of roles. I simply don't know how we can
keep going, spending less than what we say we're going to spend and
trying to have a 2.5% of GDP defence policy on a 1.5% of GDP spend.
I
would argue that we need to pick specific roles and contributions and
do them the best we can, as opposed to trying to do all things.
I understand where the professor is coming from, and it's very logical.
Having said that, it's really tough to predict what the future might
bring, so you have to have a certain amount of flexibility in the suite
of cards that you can play.
Of
course, let's not forget the value of diplomacy, a comprehensively
staffed and engaged diplomatic corps, and international assistance. That
other leg of the stool, if you will, is the defence or deterrence
capability. There may come a time, five or 10 years from now, when you
want to focus on the UN, which means, more often than not, land-centric.
Maybe you want to contribute to a force in NATO, which is usually
land-centric, with some air and some sea.
Sovereignty demands a much greater focus on surveillance, which is
satellites—which is air force—and then, of course, things that are on
the surface of the water and underneath, which is essentially navy. You
still have to have soldiers there, but in vastly smaller numbers than
you might need for other operations.
You
have to have flexibility when you build your force to cater to
differing missions. It's a balance that you strike. Right now, I would
submit, like the professor said, we're not doing anything terribly well.
(1015)
It's a terrible note to end a committee on: We're not doing anything
very well. It sounds like Mrs. Gallant will jump on that as a title for
our study.
I want to thank both of you on behalf of the committee for joining the issue. This is a real live issue.
I
think it was Ms. Lapointe or Ms. Lambropoulos who said that, to
everyone's great surprise here, not everybody in Canada follows the
proceedings of this committee. I know they should, and it's shocking
that they don't. Getting the message out there is the issue. I
particularly appreciate Professor Lagassé's sobering reminder that there
have been a number of things that we got out the door.
It
reminds me of an experience I had in the United States. I was leading a
delegation of parliamentarians there. My co-chair was before the
foreign affairs committee and said, “Those darn Canadians, they're
falling short of their 2%. I'm going to see them this afternoon and I'm
going to tell them so.” That afternoon, we all troop into his office
and, sure enough, Bill says, “I guess you're here because of what I
said.” Well, it was for other reasons as well, but after he beat us up, I
used Professor Lagassé's shopping list of things that we've actually
done. I made the point that we had bought almost all that stuff from
him.
I don't think it's entirely a dismal failure, but both of you have
joined the issue brilliantly and I think it's a real contribution to our
study.
With that, we're adjourned.
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